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Abstract
Increasing the use of public bus transportation and decreasing the use of private
modes Is the remedy for New Delhi's congested streets and polluted air. To achieve
this, the provisioning of bus services In New Delhi should be privatized to reduce the
financial burden on the government and augment capacity. Regulation of the priva-
tired svstem will be needed to improve safety; prevent private operators from coneen-
trating only on denser routes; improve reliability, punctuality, and other standards of
quality; rationali;e fares; and improve network design. This article discusses each of
these goals and assesses the applicability in the New Delhi context of the different pri-
vatiiation models used internationally to meet these goals. Two composite strategies
afe recommended for meeting all of the goals; the gross cost option and the net cost
option.
Introduction
New Delhi is facing a serious transportation crisis due to the increasing shift
toward private means of transportation, in part because of the relative high per
capita income of the city and poor traffic management, which has lead to con-
gested roads and unacceptable levels of air pollution. An effective way to reverse
the trend toward increased congestion and air pollution is to increase the role of
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public transport in New Delhi (TERI 2000b). Unfortunately, New Delhi's public
transportation sector, comprised of public and private buses, is not currently up to
the challenge. New Delhi's public bus company, the New Delhi Transport
Corporation (DTe) is crippled by large operational losses (TERI 2000b). And,
New Delhi's private buses are infamous for their poor safety record. New Delhi's
public transportation sector needs to be privatized and restructured.
Privatizing should reduce the financial burden on the government and aug-
ment capacity, Regulation will be used to improve safety; prevent private oper-
ators from concentrating only on denser routes; improve reliability, punctuality.
and other standards of quality; rationalize fares; and improve network design.
This article addresses each of these goals and assesses the applicability in the
New Delhi context of the different privatization models used internationally.
Two composite strategies are recommended for meeting all of the goals: the
gross cost option and the net cost option.
The gross cost option requires the government authority to set the routes
operated and the fares charged. The fare revenue, however, accrues to the gov-
ernment authority, which then pays the private operators (PO) an agreed-upon
amount per kilometer traveled. This way, even though each route can be oper-
ated by multiple PO, the PO do not have any incentive to recklessly race oth-
ers to bus stops in order to gain more passengers. Furthermore, the PO are not
hurt by fares that do not correspond to costs. The government anthority awards
the routes via competitive tender to the lowest bidder. Preference is given to
PO that have achieved high standards of quality. This prevents PO from con-
centrating only on dense routes and provides the PO with the incentive to
improve quality.
The net cost option allows PO to keep the fare set by the government. The
government authority sets the routes and assigns each route via competitive bid
to the PO requiring the least amount of subsidy or willing to pay the greatest
fee. Again, the government authority can give preference to PO that have
achieved high standards of quality. This provides the PO the incentive to
improve quality. Since each route is contracted out to a single PO, the PO need
not compete for passengers on the route,
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Background of Public BusTransportation in New Delhi
Public bus service in New Delhi is provided in three ways. The govemment-
owned DTC operates its own buses and hires private buses under its kilometer
scheme. Under this scheme, fares accrue to the DTC while the PO run the route
assigned to them and are compensated on a per kilometer basis. Public bus ser-
vice is also provided by PO running under the Blueline scheme. The State
Transport Authority (STA) issues permits and sets routes and fares for the
Blueline buses. Blueline services outperform the DTC on most physical parame-
ters. achieving higher fleet utilization and lower number of staff per bus (TERI
2000b). The DTC is currently having severe financial difficulties, having accu-
mulated losses of 1.85 billion rupees in 1998/99 (TERI 2000b). Unfortunately,
the Blueline services have a poor road safety record and poor consumer satisfac-
tion. This is a result of New Delhi being ineffective in regulating the large num-
ber of private operators and of Blueline operators neglecting quality and over-
working their crews (TERI 2000b).
Privatization
The purpose of privatizing is to improve the financial performance of the
public transport sector.
Reduce the Financial Burden
The DTC lost 2072.96 million rupees in 199912000 alone. It has an accu-
mulated loss of 1.85 billion rupees as of 1998/99 (TERI 2000b). According to
Agarwal (1997), these losses are attributed to:
• the large number of idle employees;
• large number of averaged buses;
• high instances of avoidable breakdown;
• high downtime of buses;
• free travel by policemen, students, DTC employees, and their friends;
• underutilization of buses;
• high staff-to-bus ratio;
• cost-overruns;
• high operating costs;
• red tape;
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• bureaucratic delays; and
• lack of professional management and autonomy.
These are all symptoms of inefficient management of the DTC.
Unbundle Operations to Reduce the Financial Burden
The idea is that a PO would be able to provide a more efficient and lower-
cost bus service than a public company. Thus, switching from a public compa-
ny to pas would increase the efficiency of public transportation, which IIauld
lower the financial burden on the government. This seems to be the case cur-
rently as the kilometer-scheme buses incur relatively lower losses than the
D'TC's own buses (TERI 2000b). The B1ueline buses have better fleet utiliza-
tion (93% compared to 82.6%) for the DTC, and lower number of staff per bus
(4.6 compared to 9.56 for the DTC; TERI 2000b). The theory behind this is
that operations that are not natural monopolies are better left to the market
where the forces of competition will make them more efficient. Charles Lave
uses this idea as the foundation for his argument that policymaking should be
separated from operating. He sees the role of the government authority as
arranging or sponsoring public transportation rather than supplying the trans-
portation itself (Lave 1985).
In the case of New Delhi, this idea should be applied by unbundling the
DTC's operations into four parts: city buses, interstate buses, repairs and main-
tenance facilities, terminals and stations. The operation of city buses and of the
repairs and maintenance facilities should be privatized. Interstate buses should
be left as a public entity until the state-to-state reciprocal agreements that they
operate under expire. However, the operation of terminals and stations should
remain publicly controlled because this is a natural monopoly.'
Augment Capacity without Government Investment
The number of buses operating in New Delhi would have to be increased
by about 45 percent (calculated based on data from TERI 2000b and TERI
2000a) to achieve the 75 percent modal split in favor of public transportation
that the Planning Commission and the Government of National Capital
Territory, New Delhi, have recommended. The private sector can augment
capacity due to increased efficiency (TERI 2000a). Being able to do more with
Vol. 5. No. I. 2002
Journal of Public Transportation 91
less allow s private operators to run routes otherwise unprofitable to the public
sector, or to increase the frequency and so decrease the load on each bus.
International experience shows this. Deregulation has increased the number of
buses in Morocco (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer 1993). In Istanbul and Bangkok,
PO run routes that the public sector would find uneconomical to operate
(Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer 1993). Deregulation led to an increase in fleet size
in Santiago, Chile. from 1983-1993 (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer 1993).
However, the private sector can be expected to augment capacity only as long
as it is profitable to do so. The United Kingdom outside of London increased
its capacity by 26 percent through deregulation. The tradeoff, however, was an
increase in fares by 23 percent. London was able to increase capacity by about
29 percent, and reduce subsidy by 70 percent. but not without increasing fares
(Armstrong-Wright 2000). The bottom line is that besides increasing efficien-
cy. augmenting capacity must be paid for either by patrons in the form of high-
er fares or by the government in the form of subsidies.
RegUlation
The purpose of regulation is to create an effective regulatory framework
for the public transportation sector.
Improving Safety
The privately operated stage carriage buses (Blueline) of New Delhi are
infamous for their poor safety record. The results of a survey presented in the
Indian Journal of Transport Management show that 84.47 percent of the
respondents ranked these Blueline buses as poor in safety. Unfortunately, it
also showed that 27.78 percent of the respondents ranked the buses run by the
DTC, a public corporation, as having poor safety also (Goel 2000). The main
cause of this poor safety record is the competition over passengers. PO that run
on the Blueline scheme of New Delhi are especially known for racing to reach
the next bus stop before the competition in order to capture more passengers
and so reap a higher profit. This happens because many different PO as well as
the DTC operate on the same route. Buenos Aires faces the same problem of
aggressive driving by PO (Salvucci 1997). The desire to cut costs is also a large~~
contributor to the problem. Despite the STNs regulation that buses have two
l'bl. 5. No.1. 2002
92 Journal of Public Transportation
drivers, more than 50 percent of drivers worked 12 to 16 hours a day.
Furthermore, the quality of the drivers is questionable, as 87.5 percent have not
had formal driving training and they generally have low levels of education
(Dhingra and Savant 1998). Methods for solving the two problems of passen-
ger capture and excessive cost cutting are addressed below.
Competition for the Market. J. Walters suggests that there be competition
for the market, but not in the market. Instead of having several operators com-
peting for passengers on the same route, operators would compete to be award-
ed the concession for the whole route (Walters 1998). Bus drivers would be less
motivated to resort to aggressive driving and instead be more concerned with
improving the quality of their service in order to win future concessions. This
could also ameliorate the problem of excessive cost cutting. Employing
untrained and overworked drivers decreases the quality of service provided in the
form of increased accidents and poor driver conduct. If a PO was competing with
other PO for the rights to a concession, then the PO would endeavor to increase
quality even if that meant higher costs. This solution requires that the government
authority ensure that concessions are awarded competitively and with an empha-
sis on safety and quality. Not only would this require a certain standard of mon-
itoring to assess the performance of the PO, but also a large amount of political
will. It is essential that the government authority have the political will to punish
unsatisfactory operators; otherwise this system will degenerate into nothing more
than a patchwork of local monopolies. This system of competitive concessions
has been used successfully in both Hong Kong and Santiago, Chile (Armstrong-
Wright 2000). Unfortunately for this model, in New Delhi, law allows an opera-
tor to own only between one and five buses; thus, he would not be able to service
a whole route unless that law is repealed.
Gross Cost Model. The second way in which to solve the safety problem is
to use the gross cost model. In this model, ticket revenue accrues to the govern-
ment authority, which in tum pays PO a per kilometer fee. This takes away the
PO's incentive to increase passenger load and so there is no reason for them to
engage in reckless driving. Since the DTe already uses the gross cost model for
its kilometer-scheme buses, adopting this model would not require instituting
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something new, but rather just expanding a system already in place. Interestingly,
during March 1998, March 1999, and February 1999, the rate of accidents per
100.000 km was lower for kilometer-scheme buses than DTC-operated buses
(:'\ew Delhi Transport Corporation 1999). However, without the incentive to
attract customers, PO are less likely to make improvements to their service that
would attract customers. This requires strict supervision to ensure that the oper-
ators are running their routes as scheduled and are correctly recording fares col-
lected. These concerns caused London Transport to change from the gross cost
model to the net cost model where PO keep the fares (Armstrong-Wright 2000).
Most important to any effort to improve the safety of public transportation
is an effective regulatory body. Regulations concerning drivers' qualifications
and conduct must be enforced. If nothing else, the STA should be given better
means by which it can enforce regulations on the PO.
Prevent POfrom Concentrating Only on Denser Routes
PO prefer to concentrate on the more heavily traveled routes, while
neglecting the less traveled ones. This can be seen in the case of New Delhi,
where the Blueline operators who had been assigned less-traveled routes asked
that the STA change their routes. This is counter to the governments' desire to
have public transport available for all of its citizens, not just those along the
denser routes. The sections below discuss means of addressing this problem.
Cross Subsidization. The first means of solving this problem is cross sub-
sidization. This model assigns a mix of economic and uneconomic routes to
each operator. The profit that PO make on dense routes makes up for the loss
on the less-traveled routes. This model has been adopted by Hong Kong
(Armstrong-Wright 2000). However, this would be difficult to do in the case of
New Delhi because most PO own between one and five buses and so would not
be able to service more than one route. Even if the number of buses owned by
each operator increased, this model would be complicated to implement
because the government authority would have to asses the profitability of each
route so as to balance the profitable routes with the unprofitable routes.
Cross Subsidization and PO Associatives. Korea has overcome this prob-
lem by organizing the PO into large associatives. These associatives are assigned
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a mix of routes, and the PO take turns running the profitable and unprofitable
routes assigned to their associative (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer 1993). However,
because of the large number of PO in New Delhi, forming these associatives
would require a lot of time and effort on the part of the govermnent.
Competitive Tenders. Another way to correct for the varying profitability
of routes is to use competitive tenders, whereby PO bid for the amount of sub-
sidy they would require to run each route. In the case of dense routes, the bids
would be negative so the PO would pay for the privilege of running those
routes. Variations of this model are used in Adelaide, Australia (Radbone
1997), Istanbul, Bangkok (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer 1993), London, and the
United Kingdom outside London. In tbe United Kingdom, for example. local
authorities offer subsidies for unprofitable routes to the lowest bidder but there
is no bidding on profitable routes (Armstrong-Wright 2000).
Gross Cost Model. The fourth way to solve this problem is to contract out
every route on a gross cost model. The profit made by the government on the
dense routes offsets the loss on the less dense routes. Since the PO do not keep
the fare, but instead receive a fee for the distance traveled, there is no prefer-
ence for denser routes. On the other hand, there could be a preference for the
less-dense routes because the bus would move faster, cover more distance-
collecting more money from the government authority. To correct for this pref-
erence, the routes would be assigned to the PO who would accept the lowest
compensation per kilometer for each route. PO would be willing to accept
lower payment per kilometer for the less congested routes because they would
be able to cover more distance.
Improve Reliability, Punctuality, and Overall Quality
Another important concern is the reliability, punctuality, and overall quality
of the public transportation. These aspects need to be improved if public transport
is to compete successfully against two-wheelers, three-wheelers, and the private
car. According to a survey presented in the Indian Joumal of Transport
Management, 38.88 percent of those polled said that the DTC had poor punctual-
ity; and 29.39 percent noted the Blueline had poor punctuality. Of those surveyed,
41.66 percent said that the DTC had poor dependability; and 41.66 percent
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complained of poor cleanliness. The DTC was ranked as poor for overall service
by .+8.-+0percent of the respondents. Privately operated buses fared no better; they
were ranked as poor by 48.50 percent (Goel2000).
Reliability, punctuality, and overall quality can be improved though qual-
ity incentive contracts and competitive tenders.
Quality Incentive Contracts. London is trying to get PO to improve the
quality of service provided by using quality incentive contracts. Under these
contracts, the PO receive increased payments from the govemment authority
for positive quality achievements, and receive fines when quality standards are
nor met (Armstrong-Wright 2000).
Competitive Tenders. By placing routes up for rebid every few years and
awarding high-quality PO the routes of the poor-quality PO, the govemment
authority creates an incentive for the PO to run a high-quality service. Hong
Kong and Santiago. Chile, both use this model (Armstrong-Wright 2000).
With both of these models, monitoring is important. The government
authority must be able to assess the quality of each individual PO to determine
whether to continue or terminate their contract or to give quality bonuses.
However, the competitive tender model would be easier to manage. Under the
competitive tender model, it would not be necessary to draw up more complex
quality contracts, negotiate with each PO, fine the PO, and resolve disputes
over fining that would inevitably occur. Instead, the government authority
could simply refuse to renew the contract of poorly-performing PO. To reduce
the burden on the government authority, the competitive tender model should
be given preference in the case of New Delhi.
The gross costs model calls for an even greater need for monitoring.
Because the PO have no motivation to increase ridership, there is the danger
that the PO would not even complete the route assigned to them, much less
maintain a high-quality service. It is for these reasons that London abandoned
the gross cost model in favor of the net cost model (Armstrong-Wright 2000).
Rationalize Fares
Governments decide to cap tickets prices to make them affordable to the
less well-off, to encourage the use of public transport over private transportation,
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or to give concessional travel to certain groups of people (e.g., students). It is
politically difficult to increase fares, even when the cost of providing the service
increases. In New Delhi, there is no set formula for increasing fares when inputs
increase nor is there a periodic assessment of the fares. The fare rate is deter-
mined by political rather than economic considerations (TERI 2000b). An
increase in the PO's costs without a corresponding increase in fares results in a
decrease of the PO's ability to maintain their vehicles, resulting in a decline in
quality, which in tum causes ridership and revenue to fall. This is the case in
Medellin, Colombia, where PO are not able to replace aging buses (Gomez-
Ibanez and Meyer 1993). Privatization efforts in Kingston, Jamaica, in 1983,
resulted in the deterioration of quality and quantity (Armstrong-Wright 2000).
Thus, while PO may be able to operate bus service more efficiently than the pub-
lic company, they still need a certain amount of revenue to cover operating costs.
maintenance, and fleet replacement. If fares are kept too low, the PO will not be
able to replace or maintain their fleets. The following sections examine four ways
to avoid this problem.
Periodic Fare Increase. Fares could be increased using parameters such
as inflation and fuel costs. This is also known as the cost plus formula, where-
by the fare is set equal to the cost of providing the service plus an acceptable
rate of return minus an efficiency incentive factor.
Competitive Tenders with Variable Fares and No Subsidy. In this model.
which was adopted by Hong Kong and Santiago, Chile, the government author-
ity allocates routes to PO via competitive tenders. Criteria for selection include
fares to be charged, age of buses, and quality of service to be provided
(Armstrong-Wright 2000). This allows the government authority to make trade-
offs among quality, frequency, and fares. The fare is renegotiated every time the
tenders are rebid. For New Delhi this could be more difficult because the large
number of PO would make it difficult to individually determine the fare that each
one could charge. It would also mean that there would be a large variation in
fares across the City, which would be inconvenient for passengers. Furthermore.
the government might not want to raise fares for political and social reasons.
Competitive Tenders with VariableSubsidy and Fixed Fares.Another solu-
tion is again to allocate routes to PO based on competitive tenders. Since the
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fares are fixed by the government, the PO bid on how much of a subsidy they will
need or how much they would be willing to pay the government to run the route
at those levels of fares. Internationally, this model is most often used by govern-
ments to get PO to run uneconomic routes for social reasons, as is the case out-
side London (Ann strong-Wright 2000), Morocco (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer
1993). and Bangkok. Bangkok is the only one of these areas to collect a fee for
allowing PO to run on the more profitable routes (Ray 2000).
Gross Cost Model. In this model, the fare revenue accrues to the govern-
memo which pays the PO on a per kilometer basis. The government sets the
fares as it likes because the PO are insulated from the revenue risk.
Improve Network Design
The network or route design is important for a successful public trans-
portation system. Unfortunately, in New Delhi the responsibility for route
design is split between the DTC and the STA and "there is no systematic exer-
cise for network and route design." The result is that "routes are decided on the
basis of public pressure and not on the basis of a scientific assessment of the
demand" (TERI2000b). Three models for assigning the responsibility for net-
work design are discussed below.
Responsibility of the Government. Designing the network can be the
responsibility of a single government authority-as has successfully been done
in both London and Curitiba, Brazil. As for the institutional structure of this
government authority, the TERI report, Restructuring Options for the Delhi
Transport Corporation, recommends that an independent regulatory agency
"would be best in the long-term interest of public transportation in New Delhi"
(TERI 2000b). Both London and Curitiba employ an independent company
controlled by the government. London Regional Transport is an independent
company with a board appointed by the government (Armstrong-Wright
2000); Curitiba's public transportation is managed by Urbanization Agency of
Curitiba (URBS), an independent company owned 99 percent by the govern-
ment (Amsler 1998).
Responsibility of the PO. Design can be the responsibility of the PO, as
in the United Kingdom outside London, where PO can run any routes they
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choose. However, PO have the tendency to concentrate on the more profitable
routes while neglecting others. Decentralized decisionmaking led to a lack of
information and confusion as PO frequently changed their routes.
Responsibility of Both Government Authority and PO. Design can be the
responsibility of both the government authority and the PO. In Hong Kong. for
example, the government works in consultation with the PO (Armstrong-
Wright 2000).
In New Delhi, the most appropriate division of responsibility is for the
government authority to be solely responsible for designing the network. This
is because currently all route planning is done either by the DTe or the STA.
The PO each only have a few buses and do not have the expertise to carry out
such planning so there is no benefit to devolving authority. Having the govern-
ment authority design the network would also facilitate integration between the
buses and the other modes of public transportation.
Conclusions
Several different suggestions have been presented for each of the goals of
privatization and regulation (see Table 1). Based on the discussion above, sug-
gestions that are clearly worse than the alternatives are eliminated. (Eliminated
options are shown crossed off in the table.)
• For the goal of preventing PO from concentrating only on dense routes.
the suggestion of cross subsidization is eliminated because in New
Delhi most PO own between one and five buses and would not be able
to service more than one route. The suggestion of cross-subsidization
plus PO associatives is also eliminated because of the large government
effort required to create the associatives.
• For the goal of improving reliability, punctuality, and overall quality, the
suggestion of quality contracts is eliminated because of its complexity.
• For the goal of rationalizing fares, the suggestion of competitive tenders
with variable fares and no subsidy is eliminated because of the large
number of PO involved, variation it would cause in fares across the city,
and the government might not want to raise fares for political reasons.
Vol. 5, No.1, 2002
Journal of Public Transportation 99
I Table 1
I Eliminate Dominated Suggestions
!,
I
I Goals Sueeestions
Reduce financial burden on Unbundling and pnvatization
aovernment
Augment capacity without Privatization + fare increase or subsidy as necessary
[zovemment investment
! improve safety 1 route = 1 operator
I Gross cost
IPrevent PO from concentrating only (10.,] sobSithzatiUl
on dense routes 6Id]'! Jtt5 IPOtUJvc:1titlce
Competitive tenders
Gross cost
Improve reliability, punctuality, and QUftltt'y ee lib ueB
Ioverall oualitv Competitive tenders
Rationalize fares Formula for fare increase
CAH'l]3 et iei e t3F1S3FS iH~ I EiflR€le -Hires SHe! Fie su13sia.
I Gross cost
IImprove network design
Competitive tenders with variable subsidy and fixed
fares
Responsibility of government only
i
RCJpe)ftJibilil) of 1:,'CUiiitKllt PO
ReW5fl3it illt; ef PO
• For the goal of improving network design, the suggestions of making
it the responsibility of the government and the PO and of making it the
responsibility of only the PO are eliminated because currently the PO
have no expertise, much less experience, designing route networks.
Looking at the three goals that have more than one remaining suggestion,
we see that the gross cost model addresses all of them. Thus, the gross cost model
forms its own option. In the gross cost option, each bus running a route can be
operated by a different PO. The PO charge the fare set by the government author-
ity, but do not keep the fare. Instead the fare is turned over to the government
authority which pays the PO a set rate based on distance traveled. The govern-
ment authority is solely responsible for setting the routes, which it then assigns
to the lowest bidder, preventing PO from concentrating only on dense routes.
Since the PO do not collect fares, they no longer have the incentive to reckless-
ly race others to the bus stops to gain more passengers, and they are not hurt by
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fares that do not correspond to costs. The government authority can also give
preference to PO that have achieved high standards of quality and can deny
routes to PO that have poor standards of quality. This provides the PO the incen-
tive to improve quality. Table 2 summarizes the gross cost option.
Table 2
Organize Remaining Suggestions into Distincts Options
-
Goals Gross Cost Ootton Net Cost Option
Reduce financial burden on Unbundling and privatization Unbundling and privatization
I government
Augment capacity without Privatization + fare increase or Privatization-'- fare increase or
I government investment subsidy as necesserv subsidy as necessarv
Imorove safety Gross cost 1 route - 1 operator
Prevent PO from Gross cost Competitive tenders
concentrating only on dense
routes
Improve reliability, Competitive tenders Competitive tenders
punctuality, and overall
IQuality
Rationalize fares Gross cost Competitive tenders with
variable subsidy and fixed
fares
Improve network design Responsibility of government Responsibility of government
onlv onlv
Having already assigned the gross cost model to its own option. we can
now ignore it to find the second option. There is only one remaining sugges-
tion for all but one goal, rationalize fares, which has two. However, we see that
competitive tenders will be used to solve two other goals: prevent PO from
concentrating only on dense routes, and improving reliability, punctuality, and
overall quality. Since competitive tenders are already being used, it makes
sense to use them to rationalize fares as well. This solution allows the govern-
ment anthority the option of, for political reasons, not increasing fares at the
expense of increased subsidies for routes that are rendered uneconomical by
rising costs. The government authority also has the option of increasing fares
and so decreasing subsidies. For these reasons we can eliminate the suggestion
of formula for fare increase from the second option.
The second option is the net cost option. Unlike in the gross cost option.
the PO keeps the fare set by the government. In this option, the government
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authority sets the routes and assigns each via competitive bid to a single PO.
This would necessarily require the repeal of the law restricting a PO to owning
no more than five buses. Since the PO is the only operator on the route, there
is no dangerous competition between operators to reach the bus stop first. The
government authority awards the route to the PO that is willing to pay the
greatest amount, or would require the least amount of subsidy, to run the route.
The government authority can also give preference to PO that have achieved
high standards of quality, and can deny routes to PO that have poor standards
of quality. This provides the PO the incentive to improve quality. Table 2 sum-
marizes the net cost option.
Comparing the Two Options
In deciding between the two options a key concern is whether it will be
possible to repeal the law preventing each PO from owning a large number of
buses and so allow each route to be assigned a single operator. If not, then the
net cost option will not be able to solve the safety problem. This makes the
gross cost option much more favorable. This option is also favorable because
it is easier to integrate fares among different operators and different modes with
the gross cost model (Walters 1998). However, the gross cost option will
require more monitoring because the PO will have no incentive to attract pas-
sengers or accurately collect fares. If the government authority cannot provide
the required monitoring, then the use of the gross cost option will end in
decreased quality, falling ridership, and increased costs to the government
authority. If it is possible to assign each route to a single PO, then the net cost
option is preferable because of the lower requirement for government monitor-
ing and therefore a higher probability of success.
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Endnote
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